In this paper we develop and test the idea that predictable sovereign debt crises are associated with unpredictable defaults and that default intensifies output loss following crises. Rescue packages can systematically mitigate output losses but only under very stringent conditions. If rescue packages are not based on information superior to that available to private lenders, an increase in the scale of rescue packages increases the volatility of output in debtor countries.
Introduction
Beginning with the financial crisis in Mexico in 1992, rescue packages consisting of loan commitments from industrial countries and international organizations have become an important ingredient in crisis management. Rescue packages are designed to limit the damage that follows financial crises by reassuring private investors, stopping runs and limiting contagion to other countries. The motivation for rescue packages is the belief that the real costs of crises can be reduced by quick and decisive action. While there are plausible theoretical models of crises that suggest this is an effective policy reaction 1 there are, in our view, equally plausible models that suggest such intervention is effective only under very stringent conditions.
The intuition behind doubts about the effectiveness of rescue packages is the possibility that output losses are "built in" to international credit arrangements in order to preclude strategic default by debtor governments (Dooley 2000b) . In our view the mechanism that generates the loss in output is the inability for residents of the debtor to engage in domestic financial intermediation while foreign debt is renegotiated. Moreover, international credits are designed so that creditors will find it difficult to coordinate debt restructuring following default.
2 The important implication is that coordination problems among creditors are the feature of the international monetary system that makes international lending possible.
3
In a first best world creditors would be happy to "switch off" the coordination problem if it was clear that default was unavoidable and independent of the debtor's behavior.
Following a "bad luck" default a long recession in the debtor country is clearly not in creditors' collective interest. But we cannot imagine a contractual mechanism that would accomplish this that does not also eliminate the credibility of creditors' threats to impose the penalty following a strategic default. Following strategic default a long recession in the debtor country is also not in creditors' interests. If creditors could "switch off" the 1 Among many others see Sachs (1995) , Miller and Zhang (1998) , Bhattacharya and Miller (1999) , Chari and Kehoe (1999) , Fischer (1999) , Giannini (1999) , Rogoff (1999) , Chui et al. (2000) , Gavin and Powell (2000) , Ghai et al. (2001) . coordination problem they would be left, following strategic default, with the threat to shoot themselves in the foot. The unhappy result is that creditors need to commit to punish even though the punishment benefits no one.
Can official lending mitigate this market failure? In the next section we show that this depends on the official sector's ability to act predictably and to commit not to rescue following strategic default. While it is quite easy to set out a regime for official intervention that moves us toward a first best equilibrium, we have serious doubts that official lenders can, in practice, establish such a regime.
In the final section we evaluate rescue packages in the context of an explicit model of crises. We argue that the insurance model developed in Dooley (2000a) is an attractive vehicle for the analysis because it provides an explanation for surges in capital inflows followed by "sudden stops". The model also provides a useful distinction between crisis and default. A crisis in this model is an anticipated asset exchange that generates a transfer from the official sector to the private sector. A default is a transfer that is smaller than expected.
As in all first generation crisis models, a perfect foresight assumption implies that default would never be observed because the crisis occurs at the point where the official sector's assets are just exhausted. Clearly there is no need to restructure remaining debt.
Uncertainty about the size of the insurance pool (bad luck) or the debtor's willingness to draw on and exhaust the pool (strategic) introduces the possibility default. Default occurs when the expected value of the transfer exceeds the realized value at the time of crisis. In this event some creditors that expect to be rescued are not and debt must be renegotiated.
The intriguing implication is that bad luck includes not only events such as crop failures that reduce the debtor country's ability to pay but also political events that affect the debtor country's access to, or willingness to draw upon, official rescue packages. Larger rescue packages almost certainly imply larger forecast errors for rescue packages and, in turn, larger average output losses following crises. Moreover because output losses are related to forecast errors losses should be unrelated to fundamentals prior to the crisis. In a trivial sense all sovereign defaults are strategic since, unlike a corporate debtor, countries are always solvent. However, we assume that a sovereign's power to tax is limited so that a solvent country can have an insolvent government. In this environment bad luck and strategic defaults are possible. Moreover, creditors' fear of 'cheating' by the sovereign determines the design of contracts.
The domestic credit markets differ from the international credit markets in that the lenders cannot seize the assets of the sovereign debtor. However, by making contracts costly to renegotiate, lenders can discourage strategic default.
Consider a three-period model with the periods being denoted by 0, 1 and 2. For simplicity, it is assumed that the (risk-neutral) debtor's wealth is zero (the results hold true even if positive initial wealth is assumed) and they need to borrow amount, K, to finance an investment project. The returns on the investment are uncertain in period 0 but are realized in period 1. In the first period, investment gives a return of x in a good state and a return of 0 in the bad state. The respective probability of the two states occurring is given by θ and (1−θ). After the return is realized, the debtor has to choose between repaying the debt and defaulting. In the bad state the debtor will be forced to default (liquidity default), since the initial wealth is assumed to be zero. In the good state the debtor may pay out zero (strategic default) or he may repay the amount specified in the contract denoted by Rx.
The return in period 2 depends on what happens in the first period. The return in period 2 is y if the debtor continues with the project after paying back the debt. As soon as the debtor declares default, negotiations between the creditors and the debtors begin. We assume that structure of the debt determines the expected outcome of this negotiation. A rigid debt structure means that negotiations fail with a high probability, β. A flexible debt structure means that negotiation succeeds with a high probability and the debtor agrees to pay to the creditor αy. For simplicity it is assumed that α =1/2. 4
Design of Contracts
An optimal debt contract is defined as one that balances two effects-that of deterring strategic defaults while at the same time minimizing the costs associated with liquidity defaults. A complete contract specifies payments contingent on all possible states of the world. We first outline such a contract. It is assumed that both borrower and lender have complete information about the state of the world so the lender can distinguish between liquidity and strategic defaults. The contract is specified as follows:
Debtor has to pay Rx (Rx < x) when the return is x in period 1, otherwise there is renegotiation. These renegotiations are successful with probability (1-β ) and result in the creditor allowing a partial rollover of debt into the second period. When the return is 0 in period 1 the probability of a successful renegotiation is given by 1-β 0 .
In period 1, the state of the world is determined. With probability θ, good state occurs and the project return is x. With probability 1−θ, bad state occurs and 0 return is realized. The debtor moves next by deciding whether to repay or to default. In the case of a bad return, liquidity default is certain (since we have assumed zero initial wealth). In the case of a good return, the debtor may repay Rx out of the return x, or may default and repay nothing, keeping the entire return for itself.
Next, there is renegotiation. If it is successful, both parties agree to share the third period output. If it is unsuccessful third period output is zero. The probability that renegotiation will fail can differ for the strategic default branch of the game and the liquidity default branch if there is full information.
Given this contract, the debtors' expected payoff is given by:
The lenders' expected profits must be non-negative: (assume the market interest rate is zero)
The payments must satisfy an incentive constraint to rule out strategic defaults:
The optimal contract maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (3): The results can be summarized as follows:
It can be shown that optimal value of β 0 is zero. This implies that renegotiation is always successful in the bad state of nature.
The debtors' expected payoff could be written as:
This represents the first best solution in terms of net present value of the project.
Incomplete Contracts
Because of incomplete information lenders may not be able to distinguish between a strategic default and liquidity default.
The contract may be specified as:
Debtor has to pay Rx in period 1, otherwise there is renegotiation. These renegotiations are successful with probability (1-β) and result in the creditor allowing a partial rollover of debt into the second period.
Alternatively the renegotiations fail with probability β and third period output is reduced to zero .
The lenders' expected profits should be non-negative:
The optimal contract maximizes (1b) subject to (2b) and (3b):
The results may be summarized as follows:
Value of optimum β is given by
which will be a feasible solution as long as β ≤ 1.
The first three terms represent the net present value of the project and the last term is the expected efficiency loss due to sanctions arising due to contractual incompleteness.
As pointed out by Bolten and Scharfstein, from 5b it can be seen that an arbitrary probability of a failed renegotiation, β, is preferable over designing a contract for which renegotiation always fails. The higher the probability of success of renegotiation, the lower are the expected efficiency losses.
Can rescue packages ensure a first best equilibrium? This is the question we explore in the next section.
A Model of Bargaining with Three Players: Debtors, Creditors and IMF
In terms of the model outlined above, in the presence of informational asymmetries, there will be a bias of the debtor to default strategically. The lenders may still lend if they can design a contract that imposes an incentive constraint on the debtors' behavior so that the debtors would not prefer to default strategically. Any such contract will have a bias towards unnecessary losses. As pointed out by Diamond (1993) , the reason for this is that the lenders ignore the part of the future return of a project that accrues only to the debtor.
This results in efficiency losses. Third party intervention can be welfare improving if it can help facilitate renegotiations regarding the sharing of the third period output while at the same time allowing the debtor to reap these returns.
The debtor is assumed to have no initial wealth and borrows K for investment. The return in period 1 is x with a probability θ and 0 with probability (1−θ). The debtor decides whether it will repay the creditor or default. In a bad state there is a liquidity default. If there is repayment, the debtor earns a return of y in the second period. If there is default the borrower and lender may approach the IMF for resolution that succeeds with probability π. It is assumed that the IMF also cannot distinguish between strategic and liquidity defaults.
5 When the debtor is a sovereign nation, there are political problems in obtaining the correct information about the returns. The creditor as well as the IMF faces this problem of verification of returns. The IMF imposes a successful restructuring by buying the debt for y/2 and allows the debtor to retain y/2. Thus it has enforced a fair distribution of third period output. If the IMF doesn't intervene or if its intervention is unsuccessful, with the probability 1−π, then the renegotiation as usual fails with probability β.
The optimal contract maximizes (1c) subject to (2c) and (3c):
It can be shown that the optimum value of π is The debtors' expected payoff is:
The first three terms represent the net present value of the project. The fourth term is the expected efficiency loss due to contractual incompleteness. The intervention of the IMF can reduce the inefficiencies only if β was not set at its optimal level.
If the IMF has superior information about the state of nature than the creditor, rescue packages are always welfare improving. It is easy to demonstrate in terms of the first model that if the IMF could distinguish between strategic and liquidity defaults then the first best solution could be easily reached. The incentive to default strategically will be reduced if the true nature of the debtor were revealed. There will be no sanctions in the bad state and the output loss would be eliminated.
Output Losses and Rescue Packages
We start our analysis of output losses with our understanding of the conventional wisdom. In a series of important papers Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have argued that recent crises have generated relatively large output losses for two reasons. First, they argue that for emerging markets the magnitude of capital flow reversals has increased over time. Sudden stops of capital inflows require sudden "improvements" in the current account balance. They argue persuasively that it is difficult to imagine how such a dramatic change in real transfers can be accomplished without a short-run decline in output. These effects are more severe if the country faces quantitative restrictions on borrowing following the crisis. Moreover, they argue that emerging The insurance/sovereign risk framework has two potential advantages over second generation models in accounting for output losses. In any consistent accounting framework the impact effect on output of a crisis is related to the size of the swing in private capital inflows and the associated swing in the current account balance. But while alternative models that we are aware of take the initial vulnerability of the country as exogenous, the insurance model suggests that the increase in the scale of capital inflows and anticipated reversals are related to growth in the availability of insurance.
Even if residents of the emerging market know that a crisis is likely in the future they will be willing to borrow at rates that are subsidized by the expected insurance. Moreover they will be tempted to consume now when real interest rates are low so that part of the capital inflow supports a current account deficit.
It follows that capital inflows generated by insurance will distort real consumption and production decisions before the crisis and these distortions will have to be reversed following the crisis. In this regard our explanation for the initial output loss is identical to that suggested by Calvo and Reinhardt. But it also follows that the initial output losses following crises have grown as bailout packages have grown.
The insurance/sovereign risk analysis offers an explanation for the very different pattern and intensity of output losses that have followed crises. The initial downturn in economic activity following recent crises in Asia have been quite similar. But the cumulative loss in output has been, and is projected to be, much larger in Indonesia as compared to Korea. Moreover the duration and cumulative size of output losses following the 1982 debt crisis were much larger as compared to recent crises in Asia.
In our model the duration of recession depends on whether or not the anticipated crisis also was an unanticipated default. An insurance crisis is simply an asset exchange between the government and private investors. A default occurs when the government is unwilling or unable to provide the expected insurance payments. Because the IMF and creditor governments are an important source of insurance, forecast errors for their intervention at the time of crisis are crucial in determining whether or not default occurs and, in turn, the real effects of the crisis.
Thus, liquidity and rescue packages are important, a result consistent with a variety of econometric work. But the empirical measure of default is the difference between the expected and realized demand for and supply of insurance at the time of the crisis. Since this is a forecast error it is unpredictable and is likely to have unpredictable real effects.
The Initial Decline in Output.
The loss in output following default reflects several factors. Clearly the model suggests that, following any crisis, private capital inflows will fall to zero and, if the debtor country was using capital inflows to finance net imports, there will have to be an immediate and probably costly real transfer to nonresidents. Since the government will often decide to devalue to help facilitate the needed real transfer several other channels for contraction of output will also come into play. If the government does not devalue the same transfer must be made but now it will have to be accomplished by changes in domestic incomes and prices (Cespedes et al. 2000) . Table 1 shows a simple regression of the loss in output in the year following the crisis and the swing in the current account in the year before the crisis and the year following the crisis. The results provide a solid baseline in that the real adjustment in the external balance generates a severe initial downturn in economic activity. From here we can evaluate the additional effects that might be associated with financial variables and default.
Output and Default
To test the idea that output losses are related to default we must first measure the gap between expected and realized values for the insurance pool and for claims on that pool at points in time where crises have been observed. We have a quite small set of observations of crises that might be useful in evaluating these conjectures. Unlike other empirical work on crises we have a single variable and a quite clear measure of when a crisis occurs and a less clear measure of how long it lasts. The onset of a crisis is the point in time at which private investors begin to exchange claims on residents of the debtor country for international assets. The exchange, however, might stretch over several years as liabilities mature.
The primary source of uncertainty concerning the stock of insured assets, that is the demand for insurance, is that the government will determine which assets are to be protected at the time of the exchange. This will, in turn, reflect the ability of different classes of creditors to disrupt output in the event of default. Since the government will determine relative places in line, information from one crisis is of limited help in anticipating the outcome in the next crisis. The model suggests that ex ante rates of return should be systematically related to the expected seniority for exchange.
Different types of external liabilities have had clearly different returns preceding crises and this makes our story plausible. If crises are anticipated, the anticipated stock of insurance at the time of crisis should be related to the stock and structure of private claims on the country at the time of crisis. To test this idea we regress the stock of insurance observed at the beginning of 19 crises against the stock and composition of external debt outstanding at that time. The results reported in Table 2 provide some support for the model. Each category of external debt can be interpreted as a demand for insurance. As anticipated, portfolio investment seems to be insured relative to equity and direct investment. However, the negative relationship between short-term claims and the demand for insurance is clearly inconsistent with the model.
Supply of Insurance
The anticipated stock of insurance, however, is quite difficult to measure directly. While the stocks of international reserves seem to be a predictable source of insurance, investors can never be sure that the government will exchange all these assets. The usual assumption that the government will exhaust its reserves is not consistent with the data.
Moreover, published reserve stocks have often turned out to be much larger than net reserves because of forward exchange and other derivative commitments undertaken before the crisis.
Another important source of uncertainty about the stock of insurance is that, in many cases, a quantitatively important share of the anticipated insurance pool comes from new loans by creditor governments and international organizations. At the time of crisis it is likely that a rescue package is assembled that consists of loans from several sources. It follows that investors must evaluate the expected net increase in credit from all official sources for several years into the future. Put another way, they must guess whether or not the debtor government will be willing and able to borrow from the IMF and other official lenders to pay them off when their claims mature.
For crises after 1990 we assume that announced rescue packages are an unbiased estimate of the resources investors expect to receive from the government. A problem with this interpretation is that rescue packages are seldom followed by official credits of similar magnitude. This has led many observers to doubt the importance of insurance for creditor behavior. Our view is that announced rescue packages are important since they oblige the official sector to lend if alternative adjustment measures do not provide the funds needed to liquidate private debt as it matures. In practice the single largest alternative source of funds has been the current account surplus that has followed most crises. So we view the package as creditor governments' commitment to underwrite an adjustment effort.
The 1982 crises present a more difficult conceptual problem. Rescue packages announced in 1982 were limited to bridge loans that were very small and very short term. Dooley (1995) argues that commercial banks expected their own governments to bail them out, and that the bailout eventually came, but much more slowly than expected. If we consider the whole crisis period from 1982 to 1989 we see that official credits were eventually quite substantial. One hypothesis is that in 1982 private investors had the amount of the bailout right but were surprised by the very slow disbursement. Our working hypothesis is that the expected package in 1982 was equal to the present value of the official capital flows actually observed through 1989. It follows that at the time of the crises in the early 1980s it was likely that investors were surprised by the announcement that the present value of the rescue package was almost nil. As time passed and governments provided loans to debtor countries the initial default was reversed.
Investors must guess about the ability and willingness of the government to use its assets and lines of credit at the time of crisis. Table 3 reports the results of a regression of measured insurance pools discussed above against easily observed characteristics of the debtor country. By using the whole sample we are assuming investors used information they did not have but with only 26 observations alternative approaches are not feasible.
The results reported in Table 3 suggest that the GDP of the debtor country is by far the dominant determinant of the size of rescue packages.
3.5 Measuring the Forecast Error.
The model suggests that a crisis observation occurs when the expected demand for insurance is just equal to the expected supply. It follows that we can examine the "forecast error" associated with the demand and supply for insurance for each crisis.
Suppose we observe a crisis at time t 0 . Our theory suggests that at t 0 the expected demand for reserves was equal to the expected supply. But because both demand and supply are estimated with error it is quite possible that our estimates of demand and supply will not be equal when crises are observed. There are many potential sources for such errors. If the demand curve was correct an insurance pool less than the estimated demand would imply a positive default. If the supply curve was correct an insurance pool greater than estimated supply would imply no default. Since we do not know which relationship is more likely to be correct we take the sum of the supply and demand error as our measure of default.
Our model suggests that, other things equal, the default generated by the shortfall of insurance will interfere with financial intermediation as long as the default persists. We should expect to see a larger initial decline in output and a relatively slow recovery following a crisis that involves default relative to a crisis where insurance is equal to or greater than its expected value.
The regression in Table 4 is the same as in Table 1 except that the insurance forecast error is added. As discussed above, the swing in the current account is the most important determinant of the initial decline in output. But the forecast error for insurance is also positively correlated with the output loss. The regression coefficient is small relative to its standard error, but given the difficulty in measuring the demand for and supply of insurance it may not be surprising that this relationship is not precisely estimated. Table 5 reports the results for a regression of cumulative output losses against the swing in the current account and the forecast errors for insurance. The swing in the current account loses much of its explanatory power, a result consistent with the idea that for a given transfer quick adjustment probably shortens the duration of the output loss. In contrast the insurance forecast error is little changed, it remains positive but small relative to its standard error.
Concluding Remarks
Financial crises have important real costs and identifying policies that could reduce these costs is a priority. In this paper we argue that predictions for the effects of third party interventions are quite sensitive to models of sovereign debt. In particular, if concern about strategic default is central to the design of international debt contracts, and we cannot imagine that it is not, intervention by the official sector in negotiations between sovereign debtors and their private creditors is problematic. Our analysis suggests that anticipated and unconditional lending at the time of crisis is rational to avoid the costs of default that are built into contracts. But the expectation that insurance will be provided subsidizes capital inflows that precede crises and, in turn, intensifies the current account reversals and output losses that follow. Moreover, uncertainty about the size and distribution of insurance can generate unpredictable defaults that intensify and prolong losses in output. F -test for combined significance (probability) 0.00 Table 3 OLS regression for supply of insurance 
